Out Of Time

"Blind Power" by Rudolf Schlichter 1937, Berlinische Galerie, Berlin

 

In fact some proof of Iran's preparations against possible sanctions were given two days ago by the Swiss daily La Liberte. Since last fall, rumors of Iran's transfer of assets from European institutions to Arab ones have been numerous. But La Liberte affirmed that they have confirmed that at least 250 tons of gold were transferred from Credit Suisse Zurich in three charter planes of Iran Air in October and November. The initial info came from an Iranian Communist opposition group which provided the Swiss daily with records from the Central Bank of Iran pertaining about that gold transfer. La Liberte confirmed this information with credible Swiss sources and even Credit Suisse did not deny it.

The opposition group is claiming that up to 700 tons of gold and $20 billion were actually transferred out of Switzerland during last fall. That group also stated that during a fall meeting of the Iranian leadership under the auspices of Ayatollah Khameini other conclusions were reached. Some of them are: the continuation of the enrichment of uranium, the necessary Iranian help the USA is going to need in Iraq, the US's lack of resolve re Iran after the Iraqi experience, the weakness of the Israeli leadership... This leading to the conclusion that Iran must seize the opportunity now and move forward.

So the transfer of assets in Swiss banks was decided then. Allegedly this money and gold made it to mostly Dubai and Abu Dhabi banks, some of which are owned by Ayatollah Rafsanjani and Russian financiers. Lastly Asian financial institutions received some of these assets: it is not by chance that Iranian president Ahmadinejad announced in February a $2 billion deal to build a refinery in Indonesia.

I have covered this before in several posts, least of which is 'The Road To Allah Paved With Gold', the groundbreaking 'MSM Ignores Iran's Admission Of Guilt', and Iran Is Building A Nuclear Weapon.

The British Government is to hold high-level secret talks with defense chiefs today to discuss possible US led military strikes against Iran, designed to destroy Iran's ability to develop a nuclear bomb. The MOD is denying it.

It has become increasingly obvious that if Thug-In-Chief Ahmadinejad fails to comply with United Nations demands to freeze their uranium enrichment program, this strike will indeed become necessary, and assessing the consequences of such an action becomes imperative.

The New York Times Middle East section reports that Iran has "test-fired what it described as a sonar-evading underwater missile just two days after it announced that it had fired a new missile that could carry multiple warheads and evade radar systems."

General Fadavi said only one other country, Russia, had a missile that moved underwater as fast as the Iranian one, which he said had a speed of about 225 miles per hour. State television showed what it described as the missile being fired.

"The missile carries a very powerful warhead that enables it to operate against groups of warships and big submarines," he said.

He contended that the boats that would launch the missile were able to evade detection systems but that "even if an enemy's warship sonar can detect the missile, no warship can escape from this missile because of its high speed."

General Fadavi said the missile launched Sunday took six years to develop.

Ed Morrissey:

It's hard to know what to make of the sudden spate of missile claims by the Iranians. This started when the West pressed the IAEA to make a determination last year on the efforts by Iran to hide their nuclear program and their non-compliance with the NPT. Around that time, the Iranians tested the new Shahab-3 missile, which they claim can reach targets as far away as London. Now that the UNSC has given them 30 days to comply with the IAEA and come back into compliance with the NPT, the Iranians have supposedly tested two new and completely different missile systems successfully within the past week. It's not impossible to have done so, but that might even tax the Pentagon a bit; one can imagine that the Iranians would have more trouble with that level of multitasking.[...]

The most likely explanation falls closer to bluff than reality. The continued boasting of superweapon technology combined with the diplomatic isolation Iran has experienced makes this sound like the mullahcracy is willing to pull out all stops in order to intimidate the West into backing off of Teheran. The mullahs have overplayed the threats at this point.

As Dan Riehl quite rightly points out "at some point we won't be able to gamble by playing diplomatic games forever."

The U.N Security Council gives Iran thirty days.

The Defense Tech Blog gives details of the Russian connection for the underwater missile, and looses me on the explanation, but then anything with a tech in front of it is game over for me.

Whilst the army of appeasers are still worried that an attack on Iran may trigger off terrorism.

More @ Allah @ Michelle Malkin, Gina Cobb, A Daily Briefing on Iran, WaPo, AP,  Rantingprofs, The Strata-Sphere, Booman Tribune, Middle Earth Journal, America Blog, Blogs for Bush, The Cunning Realist, American Future, News Hog, Secular Blasphemy 

Comments

[Jeff Durkin]

Brian, you said

"The U.S. military is capable of producing LOW YIELD nuclear devices on deep penetrator weapons to get at the underground facilities. LOW YIELD means 5-10 megatons. Underground nuclear testing went on for years in the USA as well as the USSR."

Actually, the work on earth penetrators has not advanced to the point where they can detonate more than a few meters under ground. This enhances their effectivenss against subsurface targets, but would also enhance fallout (ground bursts tend to be "dirtier" because of the higher levels of irradiated particulare matter). We do not have a weapon that can penetrate to the depth of 175 - 250 meters needed to eliminate the chance for a surface breech. Also, 'low-yield' is under 10 KILOTONS, not MEGATONS. Weapons in the megaton plus range tend to be counter-value devices (used against geographically dispersed targets, like cities) or used as counter-force against targets like airbases. High-yield weapons were also to be used against hard targets, like national command authority bunkers and the like.

Underground testing did go on for years...and involved massive boring machines, creating huge shafts into the Nevada Desert and then carefully lowering the test devices, not dropping relatively fragile bombs or warheads. These are very different operations.

A nuclear attack against Iran would follow one of three basic models. 1) A demonstration strike, perhaps not even against a target. So, we set off a nuke in the Dasht-e Kavir, along with a warning that the next time we pound their nuclear and military infrastructure, unless they capitualte. 2) We conduct a counter-force attack, hitting all known nuclear infrastructure sites. Then we get to deal with the probable collapse of Iran, the death of millions (some of the nuclear infrastructure sites are near major population centers, including Tehran) the cessation of oil and natural gas shipments for an economically significant period of time and some downwind fallout, including on allied nations (not to mention the political fallout). 3) An EMP attack, designed to cripple Iran without setting off weapons on Iranian soil.

None of these seem particularly realistic options, at least at the moment, for the United States.

[brian]

I would say that if there are any "overblown nuclear strike fantasies" these exist in Iran's leadership.

The U.S. military is capable of producing LOW YIELD nuclear devices on deep penetrator weapons to get at the underground facilities. LOW YIELD means 5-10 megatons. Underground nuclear testing went on for years in the USA as well as the USSR.

We know alot about underground nuclear detonation effects. Surface or atmospheric detonations release fallout to the wind, sub-terranian doesn't.

If the mullahs want to play nuclear hardball, they should be reminded they are challenging the master of the Atom. This is our court, and we know the game and it's rules. Wanna play?

[Patrick]

Just read my post and find I fat-fingered it badly. I find several points of agreement with Ralph Peters even when I disagree with him.

[Patrick]

For those of you discussing tactics to employ. Here is one interpretation of the effectiveness of different approaches in "Modern Warfare". I think after reading this, there may be a few more comments.

I personally disagree with him on several points, but as with everything of his that I have read, I also find several points of effort.

Ralph Peters interesting comments (Opinion Piece)on the value of what in known as Effects Based Operations (EBO).

http://www.armedforcesjournal.com/story.php?F=1547579_0406

[Joseph Marshall]

For instance, does anyone here know if a small yield nuke penetrates 300-500 feet if the resulting fireball even reaches the surface?

I really didn't have time to get back to this, but the overblown nuclear strike fantasies really do need to be addressed.

Does the author of the above know that the U.S. forces in Afganistan are downwind from a lethal fallout producing ground burst such as he describes? Not to mention millions of uninvolved people potentially as far away as India?

[gringoman]

Saul Davis,

I'm sure that taking out Iran's power grids will get close attention in contingency planning. Now, as for another perspective on Dilemna Iran, if it's any consolation, there's this from the Russian press:

22:03 | 03/ 04/ 2006

KIEV, April 3 (RIA Novosti) - The Ukrainian defense ministry denied media reports Monday that Ukraine had sold 250 nuclear warheads to Iran.

"Ukraine completely fulfilled international obligations to return warheads to the Russian Federation," Colonel General Serhiy Kyrychenko, the chief of the Ukrainian General Staff, said in response to an article published in Russian daily Novaya Gazeta Monday. "None of the warheads were lost during the return. This can be proven by relevant documents, the copies of which are in Russia and Ukraine."

The newspaper said that Ukraine had failed to return 250 warheads to Russia in the 1990s when the former Soviet republic declared itself a nuclear-free zone. The paper suggested the warheads could have been sold to a third country, including Iran.

[Saul Davis]

The OfficersClub.blogspot.com once had a very interesting series of analyses of the problems facing the US or Israel regarding Iran's nuclear development; they came up with a number of very viable-sounding alternatives [I am not a military person, so this observation comes from the perspective of a novice], and I do not remember who posted this option, whether it was one of the 3 bloggers or a commenter; however, it sounded like a very viable option (just hope the Iranians do not read this blog or that of the Officersclub).

In order to be able to develop fuel for its nuclear program, to make the warheads, etc., the Iranians need a great deal of power. While the nuclear reactors and the facilities that develop the uranium into material suitable for nuclear warfare are spread throughout Iran, and buried in deep reinforced strongholds, the eletric grid and power sources to run those facilities are not as protected -- if they are protected at all. Why not wipe out Iran's power sources for the nuclear facilities with a broad strike of tactical weapons. Once they lose their power, their develpoment of nuclear weapons will at least be temporarily halted; this will also cause significant disruption to their economy and to their military; when they try to rebuild it, we bomb it again. Eventually even Iran may get the message.

[gringoman]

"If the Iranian leaders think they can deter an attack because the US is bogged down in Iraq they are already between the jaws of a well-set trap....Mass mobilization in Iraq against US-British forces will be at most a nuisance - easily suppressed by the ruthless employment of massive firepower. And Israel will use the opportunity to deal with Syria and South Lebanon, and possibly with its Palestinian problem.

The character of this war will be completely different from the Iraq war. No show-casing of democracy, no "nation-building", no journalists, no Red Cross - but the kind of war the United States would have fought in North Vietnam if it had not had to reckon with the Soviet Union and China."

Paul Levian is a former German intelligence officer.
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HB03Ak02.html

[epaminondas]

There are an amazing number of unimaginative war planners in here.

For instance, does anyone here know if a small yield nuke penetrates 300-500 feet if the resulting fireball even reaches the surface? Think that might be why the air force wants to test almost a kiloton of explosive in the Nevada desert? What are they after ... gas centrifuges or the mullah hidey hole? Both?

There seems little point to removing the means, scientist and manufactories without repeated and relentless decapitation strikes.

There are an awful lot of Iranian americans, with relatives back in Iran. I wonder what they are doing now?

[Michael van der Galien]

My problem with just air-strikes is this:

It will, indeed, destroy the nuclear sites; however, it will leave the extremist mullahs in power: it will stop them for a while, but they will have the knowledge completely ánd how do we know whether we really destroyed everything?

They will just start again...

[gringoman]

Certainly, Iranian misconceptions are helped mightily by the defeatism of the Western debate about such a war. "No good options" has become something like the consensus view: an airborne and special forces "surgical strike" (as well as a massive attack) against the Iranian nuclear industry and military targets could at best delay its nuclear program and will be followed by retaliation in Iraq, Lebanon etc; a ground attack is out of the question because most of deployable US ground forces are desperately busy in Iraq....

If such things could be planned, one might be persuaded to consider this debate as an aspect of strategic deception. In fact, the US and British forces in Iraq and in the Persian Gulf as well as the forces in Afghanistan are quite able to redeploy on short notice, for example during the days of an initial air campaign against Iran for large-scale operations against the remaining Iranian forces and can be reinforced during the war. The US military infrastructure at the borders of Iran has a very substantial capability to deal with surge requirements.

from article,'Iran and the Jaws of a Trap,' Peter Levian, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HB03Ak02.html

[Jeff Durkin]

The military options are actually rather limited - at least the realistic ones.

For the United States:

• Airstrikes: This is the one most often talked about and the only realistic category of military options available, given force limitations and political considerations. The air option breaks down into a number of sub-types:
  
  
  
  1. Air-only: Whatever the scope of the campaign, this option envisions only aircraft being used, with the on-the-ground presence limited to SAR teams. The obvious benefit is the reduction of the likelihood of US personnel being killed or captured. It reduces our logistics strain, particularly if attacks are launched from ships and secure Gulf States, as opposed to having to truck and/or fly equipment into Iraq. Even with the strikes being launched from Iraq, the logistics load would be smaller - and our supply chain less vulnerable - than that required for even a modest ground campaign. The drawback is that, in the case of hardened sites, it would very difficult to know how much damage had been done. Further, we would only be able to target known sites. This may seem an obvious statement; but, one needs to keep in mind that substantial parts of the Iraqi WMD program were uncovered only after inspectors entered that country in the wake of the Gulf War. And, on a tactical level, the all-air Serbian War did very little damage to Serb units in Kosovo, due to the extensive use of camouflage and deception operations. Further, an airwar could be messy, given the size of the Iranian air force. Iran has about 300 combat aircraft, although serviceability is unknown. It would be safe to assume that at least some of these aircraft, particularly older US models, are of only marginal effectiveness. And, pilot skill levels are not impressive. That said, any air campaign would have to destroy Iran's air force and air defense network either before or during a nuclear program suppression campaign. Iran has a few dozen airbases that could be used for defense against US operations, and these would have to be destroyed. We would also have to allocate sorties to major C4I facilities, in order to allow us to conduct a campaign of sufficient length and with minimal interference.
     
  2. Air-Only (Limited): This is more a sub-set of the above. Rather than launch a comprehensive, days, weeks, or months long campaign, we could use our stand-off capabilities - mainly cruise missiles - to conduct a surge attack on a variety of nuclear related targets, in the hope of convincing Iran to stop the program. This would be the easiest campaign to wage and would only require moving appropriate platforms into the Indian ocean or flying aboard US and Diego Garcia based heavy bombers. The drawback, of course, is that the strike may not cause sufficient damage to the Iranian nuclear program to force concessions (assuming Tehran has any intentions of negotiating a settlement). If not, than, while a sustained stand-off campaign could be mounted, it suffers some of the same drawbacks of the air-only campaign listed above, particularly the lack of certainty that we have accurate intel on the appropriate targets.
     
  3. Air-only plus SpecFor: Much like the air only campaign, with the addition of SpecFor units detailing from Iraq, Afghanistan and the Indian Ocean. This increases the likelihood of better intel and a more "granular" approach to destroying Iranian assets. Depending on the scope of the operations, it also would make discovery of unknown nuclear sites more likely. However, it would increase the possibility of US troops being killed or captured and would necessitate the diversion of air assets to striking some of Iran's transportation and security infrastructure. Major ground unit concentrations that could be ignored in an air-only campaign would have to be destroyed, in order to reduce their ability to interfere with SpecFor operations. This would also complicate our logistics load, although minimally. My guess is that, given the nature of the threat and the need to have a high degree of confidence in the outcome, most of our SpecFor assets would be involved. It would, however, remove valuable SpecFor assets from use in Afghanistan and Iraq (as well as other theaters around the globe). In my assessment, this is the most likely US operation, as it gives the best benefit-to-cost ratio.
     
  
  
• A ground-campaign: Any ground campaign, of course, would involve air and SpecFor participation, so assume that each of these has some level of the "air-only plus SpecFor" as a component.
  
  
  
  1. Limited-ground: This would involve the use of some of our lighter assets (airborne, airmobile, Marine), in order to seize some area of high value to the Iranian regime. This could be a major nuclear facility (like Darkhovin) or even a major economic target (say, the oil and gas region bound by the Ahvaz - Agha Jari-Ganaveh axis) that is relatively accessible to US forces and could be supplied and held for an extended period of time, while negotiations were being pursued. The objective would not be to permanently hold the target area(s). They would be bargaining chips. Given the nature of our commitment of ground forces at the moment, this is probably the only realistic option with a significant ground forces component. The drawback is that is greatly increases our supply problems and would further stretch our forces. If the Iranians choose to resist, we would be hard pressed to reinforce our initial deployment (probably the equivalent of 2 divisions/6 Brigade Combat Teams) without compromising our Iraq operations.
     
  2. Operation Iranian Freedom: A full-scale invasion followed by an occupation and rebuilding effort. I see absolutely no way this could happen in a short-scale timeframe (within 2 years). We simply do not have the forces available at the moment to invade and take over a country a fifth the size of the US, with 70 million people and an Army/Pasdaran of 500,000 troops. The terrain would have to fight through is very difficult and the logistics problems would be a severe - if not insurmountable - issue, at our current level of capabilities. Of course, Iran could be invaded, its military destroyed, and its government replaced. Whatever the difficulties, the US is far more powerful than Iran. However, a ground campaign would take years to prepare for, as more forces were raised, more equipment - particularly transportation - was procured and our existing forces rehabilitated after the extensive operations of the last few years. It would also take a long-term commitment that I do not see any US government being able to muster, short of a direct threat of an Iranian attack on the US.
     
  
  
• Unconventional: Kind of a catch-all. This breaks down into two broad categories.
  
  
  
  1. The Doctor Strangelove option: We nuke Iran. Never going to happen, unless we have evidence that they are preparing for a WMD attack against us or against another nuclear armed power.
     
  2. SpecFor/Insurgencies/Etc: We could begin a series of covert, regime destabilization operations, using special forces and supporting indigenous anti-regime elements. This would be low-cost for us - at least until one of our men was killed or captured. It also could take years and might have no effect. We could also conduct SpecFor raids on nuclear sites (difficult, given that they are heavily guarded), economic targets (more viable), or regime targets (a horse head in Ahmanijad's bed). This has the benefit of being low-cost. However, after the first strikes, security will go up, making a SpecFor campaign more costly. Further, an Afghan-style campaign (where many of our "boots on the ground" are actually indigenous troops supported by SpecFor) is unlikely, given that there is no large, armed opposition movement. While we could engage in a long-term covert war, the blowback of a US 'wetwork' team being found taking out Iranian nuclear scientists, would make this a tough call for an Administration already reeling politically.
     
  
  

Some are looking to Israel to take care of the problem for us. Israel, however, has even great constraints.

• Air-only: Israel cannot sustain a long-term, long-range air campaign, unless it is going to commit itself to using conventional ballistic missiles for most of its attacks. While the Israeli air force is large and capable, it has insufficient tanker capabilities to sustain a long-range air campaign. Unless it could secure permission to fly over intervening nations - or a base in a neighbor of Iran - it would have to fly aircraft over 2000 miles of the Red Sea and Indian Ocean before even reaching Iran. This means that F-16s would have to refuel twice before even reaching Iran. The Israeli F-15s could make it on a single load of fuel, but would have to be refueled almost immediately after leaving Iranian airspace. And, Israel would face all the problems that the US would for a sustained air campaign (although the logistics situation would be easier).
  
• Air-only plus SpecFor: Possible, but the level of SpecFor troops the Israelis could send to Iran and sustain would be very small. Further, they would have limited mobility; the US could stage forces from anywhere in Afghanistan, Iraq, the Gulf emirates, the Indian Ocean, even Central Asia while Israel would have to move them mostly covertly to staging points in the mountainous regions in an arc from Eastern Iraq through Azerbaijan. Once in the country, they would essentially be on their own.
  
• Osirek plus: Most people advocating letting Israel handle Iran seem to envision this; a one-off strike, probably with Jordanian, Iraqi and US agreement, allowing a force of Israel F-15s (possibly supplemented by a ballistic missile strike of conventionally armed Jericho IIs, although this is unlikely, since there are not a lot of them and they are part of Israel's nuclear strike force) to hit targets in Iran. While well within Israeli capabilities, the chances of replicating Osirek - a single strike derailing a country's nuclear weapon program - is almost impossible given the scope of Iran's nuclear industry and the hardened and protected nature of its sites. The actual number of combat aircraft that could be put into Iranian airspace (assuming that they are limited to Israel's F-15 fleet) is under 100, if every F-15 were put into the air.
  
• Unconventional: Israel could try a number of unconventional strike options.
  
  
  
  1. Nuclear: Israel has three basic nuclear options. The first is to flatten every known Iranian site. This is certainly within Israeli capabilities; however, I doubt that Israel would launch an attack that would kill millions and make it a pariah state, in addition to the possible repercussions as other Middle Eastern states look towards covertly acquiring an immediate nuclear capability to deter Israel. Second, they could try a demonstration strike, hitting either a single site or even a remote area of the country and saying "surrender or else." This is more likely than a mass attack, but has some of the same defects (global backlash, encourage other states to get nukes). Further, if Iran declines, than Israel is left with the option of a full nuclear strike, while Washington (as well as every other country) is telling it not to and the possibility that Iran has a nuke or two that they can smuggle in to Israel. Finally, they could try an EMP strike. With no direct casualties, but still a potentially crippling effect on Iran, this is the most likely Israeli nuclear option. It would still have some of the same political fallout (if you'll pardon the pun), although not the degree that detonating a nuke on Iranian soil would carry. Some problems with this, however, are that it could a) be ineffective as far as Tehran is concerned and b) would potentially disrupt neighboring states, including US allies.
     
  2. SpecFor: Israel could turn Mossad lose in Iran. I actually think this is the most likely long-term Israeli response and, probably, should be our response. Assassinating key members of the Iranian nuclear program, military, government and security services, as well as limited strikes on other Iranian assets, could have the effect of disrupting the program, perhaps to the point that it will never be successful. There is some indication this is already being done. This is also the kind of option that could be worked with other nations (like the US). We provide the intel and the access, they provide the manpower and the political cover. The goal is not regime destabilization, although that may be a side effect; rather, the goal is to hit them hard enough in the right places (mainly, a limited pool of talented technicians and scientists) to push beck the nuclear deadline indefinitely.
     
  
  

So, basically, the best force option we probably have is the covert war, a cooperative venture with Israel and other members of the global intel community to assassinate key figures in Iran and sabotage the Iranian program. While not flashy- and not guaranteed to succeed - given the limitations of other use of force options, this seems to be the best of choice. It would take commitment - both in time, since it would be indefinite, in resources and in setting aside whatever qualms we have about "getting our hands dirty" - and it could have significant repercussions (a full-scale Iranian terrorism campaign...Al Qaeda has nothing on Hezbollah). However, it has, in my opinion, the best possibility of success, if we decide to use force and we start now.

[gringoman]

"But airpower alone has never yet toppled a single regime."

Okay, let's not think Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and their innocent inhabitants. Let's not think Tehran, and certainly we must not think Mecca et al even if the thousand-year jihad culminates in a truly great blow against the West---you know, the West which is now a fat Dhimmi Empire of socialists and other seculars. No, we won't think the unthinkable. But does that mean that no one else will?

(new at gringoman.com, "Globalismo Foxybush."

[epaminondas]

What's YOUR documnation for this:
"which is to gamble that the five-year window to Iranian nuclear capability" .. I have seen only ONE source for this, all others refer back to this. Five years from now what do you think the bunkers will be like?

1) What on earth gives this credence? Dont tell me the CIA and then whine about WMD not being justification for Iraq.
2) What counts is NOT the actual development of the weapon itself, but the practical engineering experience to know what problems must be conquered in taking UF5 and concetrating it to U235, and/or taking Uranium extracted fom a reacotr pile and refining it to Plutonium. If you know what has to be done minutely in this process, then you can create a weapon. Just buy some klyston tubes and you're in business. Once we figured out the UF6 corrosion difficulties it took us a few months.

Finally you are thinking inside the box. Abbassi and Ahmadinejad are not. If we go after them at all, they're coming for us here, and setting off a regional war from Israel to the Afghan border. Then it's the next level. Not 20 cruise missiles and B-2's for a day or two.
The response to that won't be any conventional land invasion.

[Joseph Marshall]

No one should derive any pleasure in the way this is shaping up, or fail to realize that we are operating from a position of weakness rather than strength.

Our only available assets in the confrontation are those of air power. This is not very comforting. The advantages of air power are greatest against hard targets in fixed locations.

This is fine for Iranian nuclear facilities, which we can set back by a decade to a decade and one half, perhaps longer. But it is not fine for dealing with any other resulting venue of conflict in the region, which will undoubtedly be carried on by United States forces alone.

One of the hidden, and little understood, effects of the toppling of both the Afghani and the Iraqi governments in so short a space of time was the fact that our carrier based air-power was largely knocked off-line for fully thirteen months after the Mission Accomplished photo-op.

Air war has little staying power, particularly in the absence of the kind of forward Air Force basing which we gave up in Saudi, for the continuing comfort of the House of Saud, once Saddam Hussein was "no longer a threat". We have a long reach from the United States with heavy bombers as backup to the carriers, but it is doubtful that such a long reach can be sustained for any length of time.

There are any number of Iranian responses that would compel us to continue to use airpower against them in an extended fashion. One that comes to mind immediately would be a broad range of Iranian missile strikes against oil facilities throughout the region.

But airpower alone has never yet toppled a single regime. We do not have the advantage in Iran of a ready-made native insurgency, as we had in Afghanistan, nor, as in Gulf War I, the total readiness and positioning of our own extensive ground forces, who cannot even control events in Iraq at the moment, let alone manage yet another country four times the size of Iraq.

One of the perfectly possible outcomes of strikes anytime soon is the need to expend our air assets in an extended low-grade conflict with Iran while our own political and ground force position in Iraq also slowly deteriorates and the insurgency strengthens.

If the rumors coming from the UK Government's most ardent press supporters are true, the probable timing of such an airstrike is approximately one month before the 2006 election, in order to obtain maximum political leverage on American public opinion and shore up Republican electoral advantage.

The ethics of this aside [the tail of Karl Rove wagging the dog of United States diplomatic and military policy], the weak hand of cards the President holds would get still weaker with a Congress controlled by the opposite party--and this becomes more likely with every passing day [or DeLay].

Finally, the Iranians still have considerable room for diplomatic shadow-boxing through temporary compliance with the UN in the interval, eroding world support for an air strike in September, and perhaps making even this Administration pause before applying military power then.

The position overall is unenviable, and there is no indication that this Administration is even considering the alternative, which is to gamble that the five-year window to Iranian nuclear capability can be used to strengthen our overall military readiness to manage the effects of an airstrike before attempting such a strike.

[epaminondas]

There are only three explanations for what the Iranians are doing with these weapon announcements (all of which fall into the category of not understanding free societies)

1) Intimidation (others have held forth on this here) -somewhat likely

2) They REALLY want to egg us on so that the short flurry of cruise missiles (sent by "risk-averse" western men on the decline) may destroy a few things but will bolster their own govt internally with the people, and play well with the third world lampshade on the head crowd of tinpot dictators, and america haters (otherwise known as the UN).

3) They REALLY want to egg us on, because it WILL provoke an armageddon, and the mahdi arrives.

I don't think they think absolutely nothing will occur.
I believe that they WILL attempt to attack american civilians (a la Dana Priest)as a purposeful strategy and tactic if our attacks occur (which will be more that they anticipate if things continue unhindered). I think we better inform them that if their strategy in the event of our targeting their military targets is to attack american civilians (does this sound like "MAD" to anyone else out there?) we will be compelled to wage real war. Without limit. They won't believe us. I think if the mall of america, or the first Yanks-Red Sox game is blown apart, our reaction will be quite different from that of "risk-averse men".

Maybe they just need some VDH military cultural history texts sent over.

They REALLY BELIEVE, the "pythoness" has told them they will destroy a great empire if they do their part. We all should know how that one ended.

BTW wasn't it the explosion of this 'underwater rocket' that doomed the Kursk after it had hit the seabed? I think so.

[MarcH]

Those are important points to remember Baron. Based on your great work at GoV I expect that you are counseling caution, not passivity in the face of those possible threats.

I also think that it's important to remember the history lesson presented by David Foster (above) when considering threats brandished by the leaders of Iran.

[Baron Bodissey]

What is possibly Iran's greatest weapon of all has yet to be fully tested. That's the economic weapon, which comes in several varieties:

1. Drive the world price of oil up into the stratosphere, while making cheap back-door deliveries to countries with which deals have been cut, e.g. China.

2. Close the Straits of Hormuz, shutting off shipping and threatening everyone's livelihood -- this is probably a subset of #1.

3. Continue variations on the theme of economic boycott (begun with Denmark over the cartoons) of any Western nation that doesn't roll over and accept dhimmitude.

4. Launch terror operations through the usual local surrogates in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the UAE, and any other nearby Arab regime that "makes alliances with the great Satan". Expect these operations to target refineries, pipelines, ports, shipping and foreign personnel, all with an eye to crippling the oil industry. Probably also another subset of #1.

There are probably others I'm not remembering. But you get the idea.

[gringoman]

Quite interesting digging and reportage from Alexandra (and what a striking painting that some of us, like me, had no clue about.) Of course, the defeatniks, Dhimmi Central and anti-americanos will find new encouragement in the looming Iran crisis. Instead of taking the harder road of adults, facing the dilemna head on, they can revert either to whiner, a role that comes naturally, or kiddies wailing, stamping their feet and throwing things,(for some even more natural.) "Oh, those stooooopid Americans, see what they got us into again! Waaaaaaaaaaghghghghgh!" This permits them to leave all the heavy lifting to the U.S. The Euro and Canadian "sophisticates" know how to play this game well, allowing them to spend military funds on socialist projects, while the USA bears the great burden of the West. "Sophisticated wisdom" of course, is for their rear-view mirror, as they get to batten on inevitable mistakes made by men who act. This type observer will point out that the U.S. in Iraq, with so many mistakes (every single one magnified by MSM, and the non-mistakes and heroism ignored or downplayed), is why we, "the intelligent ones," are now needlessly stymied, maybe crippled in dealing with Iran. But another observer can also point out, conversely, that Iran is and was one of the most important reasons WHY the U,S. is in Iraq---mistakes and all, and why this was never supposed to be a hit-and-run, wham-bam-thank-you-m'am expedition which the makers of dumbed-down polls want the (hopefully dumbed-down) electorate to think it was. Two different views of the U.S. in Iraq. Guess which one the MainStream Media Mullahs and socialist Wise Men
will embrace and hug like a teddy bear? But you don't have to guess, do you?

(new cartoon at gringoman: "Globalismo Foxybush.")[Note: the gringoman-designated Ladies Who Rock are up on this burning immigration issue too. A short list of this exclusive circle includes the elegant Alexandra von Maltzen (Allthingsbeautiful.com);LaShawn Barber, Christian Tigress of Southern Color; Michelle Malkin, the Filipina Firebrand; Pamela, Zionist Hottie of Western Civilization.]

[MarcH]

"Blind Power": the perfect metaphor for the West in our time. This was a very appropriate selection Alexandra. I note how the gladiator is not only blind and having his entrails devoured by creatures (MSM, dhimmi intellectuals?) resting in the place where his breast-plate/shield should be, but he's also standing on a slippery slope.

Poor gladiator, both blind and stupid.

[Semanticleo]

When the fianl Butcher's Bill has been presented, the failure of this administration will center more on the squandering of worldwide support and the erosion of our National credibility.

With the advent of a wrong-headed, ill-conceived and half-witted Iraq war execution, we have diluted our ability to adequately answer this 21st century "Gathering Storm' named Iran.

The rape of our national treasure and the decimation of our military construct, as well as, possibly, the loss of faith by US citizens in the competence of Command and Control to fulfill their vow to continue the WoT has been conflated by the Iraq debacle. The architects of this war can apparently only appeal to americans on the basis of 'best intentions', which, by the way, is the cheapest of the virtues. Their apologists fear a sweeping away of the power base they have joined at the hip, and the inevitable consequences of 'wandering in the wilderness for 40 years' when the extent of the disaster continues to dwell 'like ashes on the taste buds' of the american voter.

The war promoters and supporters (including democrats)who have 'sown the wind, shall reap the whirlwind' when our fiscal and political coffers come up short in the coming confrontation with Iran.

[SemperLuc]

Regarding the new missile technology, that has Russia written all over it. Much of the Russians recent advances in counter-countermeasures are in the area of non-ballistic trajectory missiles. They (Putin) were recently boasting about this.

[David Foster]

In the late 1930s, one of the ways in which Germany was able to intimidate the West was by harping on the supposedly-unbeatable power of the Luftwaffe. I suspect something similar is going on here.

Certain "experts", notably Charles Lindbergh, assisted Germany in this intimidation through their public comments, and the same will happen with Iran's advertised new weapons. (I put "experts" in quotation makes because Lindbergh, although he was a fine pilot, was not an expert on either the military use of airplanes or on what turned out to be the decisive factor--aircraft production)